failed attributes
| status |
attribute |
duration |
| failed |
checks.aarch64-darwin.treefmt
|
2s |
treefmt-check:
+ through the `rad-job` CLI, so only the CLI needs updating.
- No event delivery guarantee across restarts; the catch-up in §2 is
load-beari …
treefmt-check:
+ through the `rad-job` CLI, so only the CLI needs updating.
- No event delivery guarantee across restarts; the catch-up in §2 is
load-bearing, not an optimization.
-- Patch builds evaluate attacker-controlled Nix code — same threat
- model as PRs, mitigated by the `delegates` default (§5) and
- sandbox-only execution.
+- Patch builds evaluate attacker-controlled Nix code — same threat model as PRs,
+ mitigated by the `delegates` default (§5) and sandbox-only execution.
|
| failed |
checks.aarch64-linux.treefmt
|
11s |
treefmt-check:
+ through the `rad-job` CLI, so only the CLI needs updating.
- No event delivery guarantee across restarts; the catch-up in §2 is
load-beari …
treefmt-check:
+ through the `rad-job` CLI, so only the CLI needs updating.
- No event delivery guarantee across restarts; the catch-up in §2 is
load-bearing, not an optimization.
-- Patch builds evaluate attacker-controlled Nix code — same threat
- model as PRs, mitigated by the `delegates` default (§5) and
- sandbox-only execution.
+- Patch builds evaluate attacker-controlled Nix code — same threat model as PRs,
+ mitigated by the `delegates` default (§5) and sandbox-only execution.
|
| failed |
checks.x86_64-linux.treefmt
|
9s |
treefmt-check:
+ through the `rad-job` CLI, so only the CLI needs updating.
- No event delivery guarantee across restarts; the catch-up in §2 is
load-beari …
treefmt-check:
+ through the `rad-job` CLI, so only the CLI needs updating.
- No event delivery guarantee across restarts; the catch-up in §2 is
load-bearing, not an optimization.
-- Patch builds evaluate attacker-controlled Nix code — same threat
- model as PRs, mitigated by the `delegates` default (§5) and
- sandbox-only execution.
+- Patch builds evaluate attacker-controlled Nix code — same threat model as PRs,
+ mitigated by the `delegates` default (§5) and sandbox-only execution.
|